Speaking, listening, reading, and reasoning all depend on common, fundamental aspects of linguistic structure. This common structure is defined by the grammar, and so Bever (1970) calls grammar 'the epicenter of all language behavior' in his pioneering study of how grammar and the structures it defines may relate to other cognitive abilities. Computational models with this perspective have become more sophisticated since 1970. While many fundamental questions remain open, a substantial, non-trivial consensus about the nature of linguistic structure has emerged, and a wide range of methods for computing that structure are well understood. Much less is established about how the structure or content of grammar may be grounded in other cognitive abilities, but here again there is a much better understanding of how these could be related, and some proposals are getting sophisticated enough for preliminary empirical assessments.
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The influence of language on normal human cognition is vast and varied. We hear, speak, read, write, notice clever turns of phrase, chant incantations, sing and dance to rhymes.
The idea that all this activity is governed by just one, uniform cognitive mechanism is plainly a non-starter, and yet in all these activities the distinctively linguistic structure is largely shared. For Bever (1970) , this common structure is the 'epicenter of language', the grammar, and the project of identifying its role in mental life has been a fundamental part of constructing "an experimental mentalism" (Fodor, Bever, and Garrett, 1974, p.xi) . But in the past decades, besides all the expected vicissitudes of experimental science, this project
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The epicenter of linguistic behavior 2 has faced a number of conceptual obstacles. Some of the most significant of these are finally tumbling down. In particular, there are at least three conceptual issues which have been yielding as computational studies of language have advanced in the past couple of decades.
First, languages are vast and enormously various. Getting a grip on their role in mental life depends on understanding something about the properties they all have. Attempts to obtain a broader view by listing their significant, universal properties, so prominent in the 1960's and 1970's, seem to many to have foundered. Languages that are consistently OV tend to be agglutinating (Lehmann, 1973) , but there is the fusional Akkadian; languages in which the demonstrative follows the noun tend to have the adjective after the noun too (Hawkins, 1983; Greenberg, 1963) , but there are Hausa, Tzotzil and many other apparent exceptions. Literally thousands of such proposals and apparent counterexamples are now documented. 1 Chomsky (1965, p.209n; 1976, p.56) suggests that such proposals are not looking for properties that are 'deep' or 'abstract' enough, considering for example the restrictions on extractions from subject positions, and noting that the bearing of evidence on such abstract properties can only be assessed relative to a "pretty rich framework of analytic assumptions." But this raises more conceptual problems! Turning to the rich framework of theoretical assumptions needed to relate relatively abstract principles of grammar to linguistic judgments about particular sentences or any of the other various linguistic behaviors, we face a second fundamental issue: it seems there is no consensus on even the most basic theoretical claims. Are sentence structures built in part by movements that leave traces? And if there is movement, do we really have head movement, A-movement, covert movement, and a special parallel merge for coordinate structures? Are structures built up from lexical items whose pronunciation is then altered by phonological rules, or does an independent level of morphological structure intervene with its own well-formedness conditions? Or are there no rules at all, but only preferences determining an optimal form holistically? Even within a particular linguistic tradition that may
The epicenter of linguistic behavior 3 have some loose consensus, the points of consensus seem to shift constantly. As Townsend and Bever (2001, p.45) note at the very beginning of a review of this literature, "especially in the last two decades, the rapid changes in syntactic theories have left psychologists in large part baffled as to how to integrate grammatical knowledge and behavior in rigorous models."
A third, related problem concerns the identification of the psychological mechanisms involved in computing grammatical structures. Even if we knew what the structures were, exactly, there seem to be a great range of possible ways to compute them. To put the matter more pointedly, even given a particular, grammatically-defined relation between pronounced forms and structures, it seems that there are so many degrees of freedom in computing any such relation that any possible evidence about judgments of well-formedness, self-paced reading times, fMRI results, etc. could be explained by a diverse range of computational models.
These three problems -what are the common properties of human languages; what assumptions appropriately relate grammar and various aspects of performance; and how could particular kinds of computations of those relations be evidenced? -these problems have encumbered the first steps toward a science of language and cognition in ways that are, I think, unprecedented in the sciences. The first problem is unique in the nature of the diversity to be tamed. The latter problems are unique to computational models of complex naturally occurring systems like the human mind.
Syntactic structure: revealing the hidden consensus
The sometimes rancorous debates at the frontiers of an active science can hide the common ground on which almost everyone stands. Of course, science does not require complete agreement about anything, but the bearing of evidence should be plain enough, even
The epicenter of linguistic behavior 4 across competing scientific traditions, to have some force. In linguistic theory, a long series of results has revealed that the points of consensus are very much more substantial than linguists have realized. In particular, a very significant computational consensus was identified by Joshi (1985) in his hypothesis that human languages are both strongly and weakly mildly context sensitive (MCS). While any empirical test of this hypothesis still depends on a network of theoretical assumptions, the claim is so fundamental that it can be connected to many diverse traditions in grammar. To say that language is "strongly and weakly" MCS is to say that MCS grammars can both define the sentences of human languages (weak adequacy) and also provide the structures of those languages (strong adequacy). Joshi's original definition of MCS grammars was partly informal, so there are now various precise versions of his claim. One is that human languages are defined by tree adjoining grammars (TAGs) or closely related grammars, and another theoretically weaker MG with sideward movement (SMMG); MG with in which relativized minimality constrains extraction (RMG). Every linguist knows that these grammars were not designed to mimic each other. On the contrary, these various ideas come from sometimes fiercely opposed grammatical traditions, and yet they converged on grammars that are weakly equivalent in the sense that they define exactly the same sets of sentences. Not only that, but many of these proofs of weak equivalence are easy because the recursive mechanisms are actually much more similar than superficial differences would suggest. To take one dramatic example, MGs were designed to formalize fundamental ideas from the Chomskian tradition in syntax, but for every MG there is a weakly equivalent MCFG which is also strongly equivalent in the sense that there is an isomorphism between the derivation trees for every sentence generated by the grammars. 4 It takes some work to really appreciate the significance of these results. Probably the best known fact about the MCS languages is that while they seem expressive enough to define the discontinuous dependencies found in human languages, with some few exceptions under investigation, 5 they can be recognized efficiently in the computer scientists' sense; that is, a polynomial function sets an upper limit on the number of steps required to correctly decide whether a sentence is generated by the grammar. This property may not have been expected, since garden paths and various other kinds of constructions are not successThe epicenter of linguistic behavior 6 fully recognized by people even in short sentences. A second, more important but much less well-known property of many MCS grammars is that, while they may derive rather complex structures, the derivations themselves are relatively simple. This was noticed early for TAGs (Vijayashanker, 1987; Weir, 1988) and more recently for MGs (Michaelis, Mönnich, and Morawietz, 2000; Morawietz, 2001; Kobele, Retoré, and Salvati, 2007; Mönnich, 2007; Graf, 2011; Kobele, 2011) . These grammars can be regarded as having similar 'two step' structures: a relatively simple derivation feeds an even simpler mapping to pronounced, interpreted forms. Consider the simple tree on the left in Figure 1 Stabler (2012) for the parsing algorithm that computed these structures from the input which wine the queen prefers.
the tree it derives, and when this idea is pinned down the difference is clear and dramatic.
Unlike the derived trees, the derivation trees on the right allow a certain kind of finite state definition; the derivation trees form a regular tree set. The mapping from derivations to derived trees can be done by a single deterministic traversal (by a 'multiple bottom-up tree transducer'), and we gain an important insight into how the pronounced languages could
The epicenter of linguistic behavior 7 be parsed: to find the derivation, we must in effect undo the deformation provided by the mapping to surface order. But that mapping is extremely simple in all MGs and also in the many MG variants surveyed by Stabler (2010) , for example.
Identifying the basic structural properties of MCS languages allows us to dismiss superficial differences in the notations and formalisms used to define them. Consider for example the question of whether there are actually traces in syntactic structure. Movement operations are something special, but recognizing them does not require putting traces into the structure. In fact, this idea is an inessential, stipulated detail which can be regarded one way or another without significant consequence for the most basic assumptions about language structure. So the current diversity of opinions about them is no surprise. Some linguists like traces, others prefer 'multidominance structures', and others regard the representation of derived structure at the interfaces as the special consequences of a fundamentally very simple derivation structure. These conceptions may turn out, after all, to differ in ways that matter, but the derivational operations themselves do not depend on them.
A final development coming out of the MCS convergence is new attention to learning methods for substantial subsets of these languages (Yoshinaka and Clark, 2010; Yoshinaka, 2010) . This preliminary and more recent ongoing work is very promising.
All these computational results are notably different in character from the speculations on the front line of linguistic research: these results pertain to very large classes of grammars, grammars with properties that most reasonable linguists would accept or at least recognize as very similar to what they do accept. This consensus is stable and rather well understood.
Performance models: basic properties
Considering how a certain sort of 'analysis-by-synthesis' parsing method might fit with recent work in the minimalist program of Chomskian syntax, Townsend and Bever (2001, The epicenter of linguistic behavior 8 p.179) say, "Hope springs eternal: perhaps a new 'derivational theory' of the psychological operations involved in assigning derivations is at hand." The formal studies mentioned just above have, at least, provided many ways that any of the MCS languages can be analyzed, and many of them are quite simple and direct. The first and perhaps easiest methods discovered were all-paths 'chart parsing' strategies, now well reviewed in a text by Kallmeyer (2010) . These methods have not been so appealing to psychologists, though, since (i) they require more and more memory, without bound, to analyze longer sentences, and (ii) they do not single out particular structures in a way that would predict garden path effects.
These two properties may favor automata-theoretic and one-path-at-a-time parsing methods (which can be provided with reanalysis possibilities using a 'backtrack stack' or 'beam' of alternative analyses). These too have been developed, with some particularly transparent and simple proposals appearing recently (Stabler, 2011; Stabler, 2012) , 6 following on the structural insights mentioned earlier. These parsers can recognize arbitrarily long sentences of certain simple kinds with just finite memory, and they develop a favored analysis at each point. They are extremely simple, but easily recover correctly even the rather elaborate derivations of remnant-movement analyses. These (or the similar analyses of any of the MCS alternatives) should be on the list of what every psychologist should know about how linguistic structure could be calculated. The analysis-by-synthesis approaches favored by Bever and others (Bever and Poeppel, 2010) are very similar to some of the recently emerging 'rational' computational approaches (Hale, 2011) which are now being extended to MCS languages -these are not necessarily top-down, but capable of being nearly so in the recognition of clear, fluent speech.
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Habits of phrasing
One thing that has been clear since the earliest probabilistic studies of syntax (Miller and Chomsky, 1963; Grenander, 1967) 
Computational perspectives on the epicenter
Computational methods provide tools for describing rather abstract similarities of structures and languages. Most discussions of language universals stick entirely to 'concrete universals' to the extent that they do not even notice the very strong and remarkably uncontroversial computational properties of all the serious contenders in linguistic theory (or at least, those contenders that give any attention to the project of providing adequate descriptions in a restricted formalism). The first stumbling block of inappropriate superficiality is removed with this realization. Computer scientists are familiar with the fact that there are many ways to implement a computation; and mathematicians know that there are many ways to define a set of structures. Linguists and psychologists must also accommodate these facts, to recognize that in spite of the many ways to define a language, there are also many The epicenter of linguistic behavior 10 ways that will not work. It is important to know the difference. A second stumbling block of getting lost in the shifting diversity of theoretical assumptions is significantly reduced by attention to what the significant differences are. One rather surprising recent development in the study of mildly context sensitive grammars has been the emerging understanding of their 'two-step' character: derivation + mapping to derived and pronounced forms. The details of derived structures are much less important than the derivations themselves and their connections to pronounced forms. The simpler structure we find when derivations are isolated catalyzes the study of how simple the mechanisms of analysis might really be, and of how those mechanisms could extend to, or even across, interfaces. The third stumbling block of knowing how to look for reasonable implementations is reduced by comparing alternatives that really differ significantly: e.g. those that require unbounded memory vs. those that do not; those that predict left-branching to be as difficult as center-embedding; etc.
The relevant fault lines that separate feasible, empirically defensible models from the rest become clear as the broader landscape of alternatives comes into view.
